Which versions of fenomenallib are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of fenomenallib are flagged malicious: 2.7.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate fenomenallib if I installed it?

fenomenallib is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed fenomenallib — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If fenomenallib was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is fenomenallib part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — fenomenallib is associated with the 2025-08-xenlib campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find fenomenallib across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for fenomenallib (version 2.7.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging fenomenallib across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

fenomenallibPyPI

Malicious code in fenomenallib (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2025-191727

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall fenomenallib

What this malware does

Package is prepared to exfiltrate sensitive files. Different packages use different places for the malicious code: it runs during importing the module, is placed in a native binary, or in the setup.py script

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2025-08-xenlib

Reasons (based on the campaign):

files-exfiltration

Malicious versions

1 flagged

2.7.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

f27e5f7982ebbb803da97fba5beecce027adc04bface48e3a4aa393a74c656d6

09b3bc239f1844ed4387ec558bcfd1f2d3cc8347bf8f47169044dc7c0933ecbd

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for fenomenallib (version 2.7.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging fenomenallib across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
fenomenallib is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If fenomenallib was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks fenomenallib before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. fenomenallib on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.7.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2025-08-xenlib

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)

Detect & block this

O3 blocks fenomenallib-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring