ezllmgenPyPI
Malicious code in ezllmgen (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
setup.py downloads the first line of https://pastebin.com/raw/yBcUM1QB via urllib and passes it directly to os.system(f'cmd /c "{cmd_pastebin}"') during package installation. The Pastebin source is anonymous and author-mutable, so any installer running pip install EzLLMGen unconditionally executes whatever shell command is currently posted there, with no pinning, hash check, or signature. The package ships no Python modules — the src tree contains only an egg-info directory and the PKG-INFO metadata is placeholder text (Name/Author/Summary all set to 'EzLLMGen'), so there is no legitimate functionality to balance against the dropper. The install-time fetch-and-execute is the package's sole purpose.
During installation, the code attempts to download and start a malicious executable.
Likely related to 2025-08-raknet-testing-package.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-easyaillm
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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Downloads and executes a remote executable.
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obfuscation
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malware
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tool:mshta
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ezllmgen (version 2.21). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ezllmgen across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ezllmgen is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If ezllmgen was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ezllmgen before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ezllmgen-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.