extra-huggingfacePyPI
Malicious code in extra-huggingface (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package presents itself as part of the Hugging Face ecosystem but actually ships a remote-access agent. extra_huggingface/__init__.py re-exports run_agent, run_task, agent_info, and a persistence primitive from a bundled 8.5 MB Windows PE module extra_huggingface/_native.pyd. The CLI hardcodes DEFAULT_SERVER = "http://91.92.40.212:8080" and provides subcommands run, install-autostart, remove-autostart, and autostart-status. When invoked, run_agent(server=...) polls the attacker-controlled server at 91.92.40.212:8080 and dispatches tasks delivered by that server on the installer's machine; install_autostart() calls the native persistence("install", server) to register the agent for execution after login/boot so the C2 connection survives reboot. The actual networking, command dispatch, and persistence logic live in the opaque native binary, with the Python layer acting as a thin shim. The package name impersonates the popular huggingface/huggingface_hub namespace while the metadata homepage is the placeholder github.com/example/extra_huggingface, consistent with a typosquat lure targeting ML developers.
When starting the module, package activates RAT-capabilities, which includes exfiltrating sensitive data. Though the package is claimed to be for educational usage, the name and default actions suggest different intentions.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-extra-huggingface
Reasons (based on the campaign):
-
rat
-
exfiltration-browser-data
-
typosquatting
-
native-extension
-
persistence
-
infostealer
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for extra-huggingface (version 0.4.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging extra-huggingface across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
extra-huggingface is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If extra-huggingface was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks extra-huggingface before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks extra-huggingface-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.