Which versions of exflibrary are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of exflibrary are flagged malicious: 1, 1.0, 1.1, 1.11. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate exflibrary if I installed it?

exflibrary is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed exflibrary — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If exflibrary was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is exflibrary part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — exflibrary is associated with the RLMA-2024-11034, 2024-10-pyutiltool, RLUA-2026-00306 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find exflibrary across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for exflibrary (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging exflibrary across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

exflibraryPyPI

Malicious code in exflibrary (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-11584

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall exflibrary

What this malware does

When importing the module and a specific file exists in the current directory, obfuscated code downloads and starts the next stage of obfuscated code (cstealer infostealer)

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2024-10-pyutiltool

Reasons (based on the campaign):

infostealer
obfuscation
infostealer:cstealer

Malicious versions

4 flagged

11.01.11.11

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

99a43f917636ec3c9bb4e8dbaebb560d4a70fc2d1453f96b88a157c7d075265e

b90d7d71847109d990cadb70f118634fe9a7d0de543d66171d00c16ea46e28c6

95deb938eb8fd38976a38faf2fd2117318966fc829c080f35d6d999ff37d1236

4f4768515cdcf198881be036187f2b7ad9672cc51cf24c1c5b5a7f6a5847a430

d70a951a48be6a991cf76704e0cd0e232aeb4abf5de7b93db78b040f9590f43e

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for exflibrary (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging exflibrary across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
exflibrary is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If exflibrary was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks exflibrary before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. exflibrary on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1, 1.0, 1.1, 1.11 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

RLMA-2024-110342024-10-pyutiltoolRLUA-2026-00306

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks exflibrary-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring