Which versions of executor-http are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of executor-http are flagged malicious: 0.1.3, 0.1.4. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate executor-http if I installed it?

executor-http is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed executor-http — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If executor-http was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is executor-http part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — executor-http is associated with the 2026-06-compr-woodpecker, IN-MAL-2026-006133 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find executor-http across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for executor-http (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging executor-http across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

executor-httpPyPI

Malicious code in executor-http (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5281

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall executor-http

What this malware does

The package ships executor_http-setup.pth, which Python auto-loads at interpreter start for any environment where the package is installed. The.pth file calls exec() on an obfuscated single-line string (mangled one-letter underscore identifiers like _O, _T, _G, _u, _s, _b, _z) that downloads https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-{platform}-{arch}.zip to /tmp/b/bun, chmods it executable, then runs subprocess.run([bun, 'run', _index.js]) to execute a sibling JavaScript file under the Bun runtime. A /tmp/.bun_ran sentinel suppresses re-execution. The advertised purpose of executor-http is a FastAPI/uvicorn HTTP server for executor-engine — there is no legitimate reason for it to fetch a JavaScript runtime and execute JS code outside of Python's view. The legitimate FastAPI source under executor/http/ appears unmodified, and the distribution metadata is inconsistent (__init__.py reports 0.1.2, METADATA says 0.1.3, RECORD references executor_http-0.1.2.dist-info), consistent with a hijacked publish-credential adding a dropper to an otherwise normal upstream release. The.pth-based auto-execution mechanism is itself an evasion technique that bypasses review of __init__.py and lifecycle hooks, and the alternate-runtime stage (Bun executing _index.js) places the actual payload outside any Python static analysis surface.

Versions 0.1.3, 0.1.4 were compromised.

Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution.

It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker

Reasons (based on the campaign):

compromised-package
exfiltration-env-variables
exfiltration-cloud-tokens
exfiltration-credentials
abuses-pth
obfuscation
infostealer
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
exfiltration-crypto
files-exfiltration
destructive-actions

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.1.30.1.4

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

4396c593615517f1abf374bf3621ad44a9d0b5c540aaf8c8e101cd4954f7d7be

2f8706fa6e3490fd1604a5b98627ead50d01a949c03d7b1e69e3c45e63039f1c

fe7612103d2f4e8241cf1309b18f861afcd61541fbf822907f4d79cbbf5ca436

f9c1d1f9ab790bc8106fcfd74c547bcc4068a1b3f482dee948103e9db825c523

cde4da7201fbc0dd3ae09240232f5767c2893e33977d6c8ee9071d15e79f0363

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for executor-http (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging executor-http across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
executor-http is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If executor-http was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks executor-http before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. executor-http on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.3, 0.1.4 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-compr-woodpeckerIN-MAL-2026-006133

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks executor-http-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring