Which versions of executor-engine are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of executor-engine are flagged malicious: 0.3.4, 0.3.5. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate executor-engine if I installed it?

executor-engine is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed executor-engine — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If executor-engine was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is executor-engine part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — executor-engine is associated with the 2026-06-compr-woodpecker, IN-MAL-2026-006151, IN-MAL-2026-008887 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find executor-engine across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for executor-engine (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging executor-engine across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

executor-enginePyPI

Malicious code in executor-engine (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5298

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall executor-engine

What this malware does

executor-engine 0.3.4 ships a malicious site-packages.pth file (executor_engine-setup.pth) that Python's site initialization auto-executes on every interpreter start after installation. The.pth contains a nested exec() payload with deliberately obfuscated single-letter aliases (_o,_s,_u,_p,_zf,_g) for os, subprocess, urllib.request, platform, zipfile, and glob to evade simple keyword scanning. On execution it downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-<platform>-<arch>.zip to /tmp/b/bun, chmods it executable, locates a bundled _index.js via glob within the installed package tree, and runs it under Bun (subprocess.run([bun,'run',_index.js])). A /tmp/.bun_ran marker is used to suppress repeated execution. The package's declared purpose is Python job management and it has no documented need for a JavaScript runtime. Additional compromise indicators: the distribution is labeled 0.3.4 but executor/engine/__init__.py reports __version__ = '0.3.3' and the RECORD references executor_engine-0.3.3.dist-info, indicating the malicious.pth was bolted onto an otherwise-intact prior legitimate release — fingerprint of a stolen-credential republish. Pulling in this version causes any installer's Python interpreter (including unrelated invocations after install) to fetch and execute an alien runtime against attacker-shipped JavaScript.

Versions 0.3.4, 0.3.5 were compromised.

Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution.

It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker

Reasons (based on the campaign):

compromised-package
exfiltration-env-variables
exfiltration-cloud-tokens
exfiltration-credentials
abuses-pth
obfuscation
infostealer
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
exfiltration-crypto
files-exfiltration
destructive-actions

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.3.40.3.5

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

445bbd05ea0ef3e22608235bea18f26fc18aaaff2066b5512c9752ba04a6ab13

b4e5edf3841a60f3a2ca53c80a29c679091db234b244009e2c759e5d429c9a00

baadb337b0bff76d8e98f724885e4768a33ea2e47b7c30e0d52615e09920c4b9

287577f98316d25963f2b25e9312f4bc2e1dc1e3cb34e83d69c6a2fc9cc3e7e6

7fee580000475783e657a2e66ca6a4a4bd4369aa0bc9f87152b003dca6f34848

7a5de5499ea5efa514d410113aed945c2039f812ee3b886aa4b74d35aecea3e2

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for executor-engine (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging executor-engine across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
executor-engine is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If executor-engine was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks executor-engine before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. executor-engine on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.3.4, 0.3.5 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-compr-woodpeckerIN-MAL-2026-006151IN-MAL-2026-008887

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks executor-engine-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring