Which versions of example-vizsla-tutorial are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of example-vizsla-tutorial are flagged malicious: 0.1.0, 0.1.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate example-vizsla-tutorial if I installed it?

example-vizsla-tutorial is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed example-vizsla-tutorial — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If example-vizsla-tutorial was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is example-vizsla-tutorial part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — example-vizsla-tutorial is associated with the RLMA-2025-01213, GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest, RLUA-2026-00305 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find example-vizsla-tutorial across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for example-vizsla-tutorial (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging example-vizsla-tutorial across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

example-vizsla-tutorialPyPI

Malicious code in example-vizsla-tutorial (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2025-1973

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall example-vizsla-tutorial

What this malware does

Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.1.00.1.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

485a4e338a4ccaf3e5de094a83b552a37b5e0c49f26183dfa3b3a725ccc28348

7076208c5800207723c98f7b465955f1456f62bc6424a7e5b587c62c17e3a561

d5047acdff9541b0968719265aafdedb63d94f9adb9889f60c8705ada8c58966

41176b609425135fbc4875bb1defac43882327df940e4c10996fbb863e2a5477

deef2e8cdcdea345f152323902e9ab152368703bf530577fc76f82a41c5302f4

7cb95f0c10ebc07876cff1c49a87c8cf6e7d446a4c129710342af14d74d5b4b1

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for example-vizsla-tutorial (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging example-vizsla-tutorial across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
example-vizsla-tutorial is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If example-vizsla-tutorial was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks example-vizsla-tutorial before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. example-vizsla-tutorial on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.0, 0.1.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

RLMA-2025-01213GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentestRLUA-2026-00305

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks example-vizsla-tutorial-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring