eth-account-web3PyPI

The distribution eth-account-web3 installs under the import name eth_account, colliding with the legitimate ethereum/eth-account library. On import, init.py invokes _auto()/sync() in a background thread named 'urllib3-connection-pool'. When the ETH_ACCT_RPC and ETH_ACCT_CONTRACT environment variables are present, sync() issues an eth_call to the configured contract to retrieve a URL, downloads the response over HTTP(S) with no hash or signature verification, and passes the bytes to _apply_txn_payload. Python payloads are handed to exec(compile(...)). Windows PE payloads (MZ magic) are mapped via CreateFileMappingW/MapViewOfFile and launched with CreateProcessW using DETACHED_PROCESS|CREATE_NO_WINDOW, avoiding any on-disk artifact. Other binary payloads are written to /tmp/ethrt<pid>.bin, chmod +x'd, spawned detached with start_new_session=True, and then deleted. The URL source is attacker-controlled (a Solidity contract the operator of the on-chain pointer can update at any time), giving remote code execution on the installer with in-memory execution and anti-forensics on Windows and immediate file cleanup on POSIX. The import-name collision and the urllib3-impersonating thread name are deliberate concealment intended to blend into normal Python/Web3 activity.

A clone of a legitimate package with import-time malicious code activating if specific env variables are set. Once activated, it queries the blockchain to retrieve the next stage URL stored in a smart contract. The payload from the URL is then downloaded and executed. The address of the smart contract is not included in the package.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-09-web3-eth-account

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• typosquatting

• clones-real-package

• c2-in-blockchain

• Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.