Which versions of equest are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of equest are flagged malicious: 0.0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate equest if I installed it?

equest is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed equest — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If equest was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is equest part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — equest is associated with the 2026-06-ip-rotat, IN-MAL-2026-007333 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find equest across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for equest (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging equest across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

equestPyPI

Malicious code in equest (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6289

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall equest

What this malware does

The package name equest is a one-character deletion of the widely-used requests package and ships no functional library code. setup.py registers custom install and egg_info cmdclasses so that on pip install or pip download, the package collects the full process environment (os.environ serialized as key=value pairs) and the output of ps -elf, then POSTs both to http://gjampdwmdjmppwedtkpbbdkq05f6iiz6r.oast.fun via curl over plaintext HTTP. The destination is an Interactsh (oast.fun) collector subdomain controlled by the publisher. Any CI/build secrets present in the installer's environment at install time (cloud credentials, registry tokens, GitHub tokens, database credentials) are leaked to the attacker, and the running process list reveals additional host context. The README self-describes the package as a proof-of-concept of arbitrary code execution via pip install.

During installation, the package exfiltrates env variables

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-ip-rotat

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
exfiltration-env-variables
typosquatting

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

2bb3fce5427fc5a0a72380cf59e8396bf3409ceaead44f6a2df757f125b6e287

cfe07e7f1e241dde491d3d6f5553ed2247a6f8e1dfdf34b0eaa9943a2cba5094

293431a944f3eb8829d76e452763b22243f23990da542630767c3f1431e92dc1

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for equest (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging equest across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
equest is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If equest was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks equest before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. equest on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-ip-rotatIN-MAL-2026-007333

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks equest-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring