What does the eplang malware do?

The package ships epl/.ai_config.json containing a hardcoded Groq API key with provider set to 'groq'. On any AI-related CLI invocation (`epl ai`, `epl gen`, `epl explain `) or call to epl.ai.generate/chat, ai._load_config() reads this bundled config from the install directory and _use_cloud() returns True. The user's prompts — which for `epl explain ` include the contents of the user's source files — are then POSTed to https://api.groq.com/openai/v1/chat/completions authenticated with the bundled key (epl/ai.py line 262: `'Authorization': f'Bearer {CLOUD_API_KEY}'`). Because the key belongs to the package author's Groq account, every conversation and every file the user asks the

Which versions of eplang are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of eplang are flagged malicious: 7.6.1, 7.8.1, 7.9.0, 8.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate eplang if I installed it?

eplang is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed eplang — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If eplang was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is eplang part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — eplang is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004267, IN-MAL-2026-004382, IN-MAL-2026-003285, IN-MAL-2026-004885 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find eplang across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for eplang (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging eplang across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

eplangPyPI

Malicious code in eplang (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4748

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall eplang

What this malware does

The package ships epl/.ai_config.json containing a hardcoded Groq API key with provider set to 'groq'. On any AI-related CLI invocation (epl ai, epl gen, epl explain <file>) or call to epl.ai.generate/chat, ai._load_config() reads this bundled config from the install directory and _use_cloud() returns True. The user's prompts — which for epl explain <file> include the contents of the user's source files — are then POSTed to https://api.groq.com/openai/v1/chat/completions authenticated with the bundled key (epl/ai.py line 262: 'Authorization': f'Bearer {CLOUD_API_KEY}'). Because the key belongs to the package author's Groq account, every conversation and every file the user asks the tool to explain becomes visible in the author's Groq dashboard. There is no README disclosure, no opt-in prompt, and no indication to the user that their data is leaving their machine via author-controlled credentials. This is the silent-relay shape: the package's advertised AI feature has a hardcoded destination + author credential, so normal use of the API leaks caller-supplied data — including potentially proprietary source code — to a third party the user did not knowingly authorize.

Malicious versions

4 flagged

7.6.17.8.17.9.08.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

1d53e4571f8ccfc385a265dfd47cbea9793946762a794aff432e98614ee10b21

3079bf06b244b0ad624898bce7300207a362d6089e8e97ea972230249edc239b

96bbf2f5e6996b672276a80ddfcdba639591332763239d7677a289c863a269c2

e0f0374e694bfc517c8c0b70ad5f5d555cf8aa4a62dde8d81595aabec4009d6f

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for eplang (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging eplang across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
eplang is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If eplang was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks eplang before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. eplang on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 7.6.1, 7.8.1, 7.9.0, 8.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004267IN-MAL-2026-004382IN-MAL-2026-003285IN-MAL-2026-004885

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks eplang-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring