Which versions of env-loader-cli are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of env-loader-cli are flagged malicious: 0.1.0, 0.1.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate env-loader-cli if I installed it?

env-loader-cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed env-loader-cli — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If env-loader-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is env-loader-cli part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — env-loader-cli is associated with the 2026-05-eth-security-auditor, IN-MAL-2026-004427 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find env-loader-cli across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for env-loader-cli (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging env-loader-cli across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

env-loader-cliPyPI

Malicious code in env-loader-cli (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4272

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall env-loader-cli

What this malware does

The package advertises itself as a benign.env/JSON/YAML loader but its top-level init.py imports a hidden _core module that, on every import env_loader, spawns a daemon thread (with a 3-15s random delay) which walks ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.ethereum, ~/.config, ~/.docker, ~/.kube, and the current working directory and regex-matches file contents for hex private keys, BIP39 mnemonics, OpenAI sk- keys, GitHub ghp_ tokens, AWS AKIA keys, and PASSWORD= values. The harvested secrets, along with hostname, platform, and cwd, are POSTed to webhook URLs resolved at runtime from https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json, with TLS verification explicitly disabled (ctx.check_hostname = False; ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE). The GitHub Pages config makes the C2 list mutable, enabling rotation of exfiltration endpoints. The advertised loader.py/cli.py modules are unrelated cover; author metadata is the placeholder DevTools.

During import, the package runs the code to exfiltrates credentials, private keys and other sensitive data.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-05-eth-security-auditor

Reasons (based on the campaign):

files-exfiltration
exfiltration-env-variables
crypto-related
Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.
exfiltration-crypto
exfiltration-credentials

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.1.00.1.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

c292f1166524fea3daf3009405cb97a331812cd50074ee39254485514d0639fc

1749501a0825ad4a98638bbab4bd2bd9550436adcb9bb7781b6552735f7f3eb0

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for env-loader-cli (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging env-loader-cli across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
env-loader-cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If env-loader-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks env-loader-cli before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. env-loader-cli on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.0, 0.1.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-05-eth-security-auditorIN-MAL-2026-004427

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks env-loader-cli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring