enhancerPyPI
Malicious code in enhancer (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The distribution is published as enhancer but installs modules under the top-level safety namespace (setup.py declares namespace_packages=['safety'] and find_namespace_packages(include=['safety.*']), shipping safety/_python/ and safety/tools/). The real safety package on PyPI (PyUp vulnerability scanner) owns that import path, so any installer code or transitive dependency doing import safety.tools will resolve into attacker-controlled modules. safety/tools/__init__.py actively harvests sensitive values from pyUltroid.configs.Var (API_ID, API_HASH, DETA_KEY, SESSION, VC_SESSION, REDIS_PASSWORD, HEROKU_API, BOT_TOKEN) into a module-level _get_sys dict, then blanks them on the Var object and walks os.environ clearing any variable whose name contains those tokens — destructive mutation of installer state, regardless of whether this specific version includes a network sink. Package metadata is hostile/placeholder (author None, url https://fuckoff.com, description Not For U, README # safety-pip), reinforcing intent to be mistaken for the legitimate safety tool. Three independent block signals: namespace hijack, import-time secret/env mutation, and deceptive metadata.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for enhancer (version 0.2.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging enhancer across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
enhancer is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If enhancer was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks enhancer before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks enhancer-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.