easyaillm2PyPI
Malicious code in easyaillm2 (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On pip install easyaillm2, setup.py fetches a raw text body from https://pastebin.com/raw/yBcUM1QB and passes the first line directly to os.system('cmd /c "..."'), executing whatever the mutable, anonymous Pastebin paste currently serves with the installer's privileges. There is no integrity check, no version pinning, and no relationship between the destination and any legitimate publisher. The package itself ships no module code (the source tree contains only egg-info), and its name/description mimic LLM-tooling naming (easyaillm2 / easyllama2) — the install-time Pastebin dropper is the package's only behavior. A Pastebin owner can swap the payload at any moment, turning every future pip install of this version into arbitrary remote code execution on the installer's machine.
During installation, the code attempts to download and start a malicious executable.
Likely related to 2025-08-raknet-testing-package.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-easyaillm
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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Downloads and executes a remote executable.
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obfuscation
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malware
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tool:mshta
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for easyaillm2 (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging easyaillm2 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
easyaillm2 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If easyaillm2 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks easyaillm2 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks easyaillm2-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.