donutautosellsrcPyPI

setup.py invokes a module-level _trigger() that runs during pip install / PEP 517 wheel build. The trigger calls donutautosellsrc.build.run(), which downloads https://thisisafalsepositive.st/cdn/v2/9f4e7a2c1b8d.png, locates a ZIP local-file header (PK\x03\x04) or EOCD (PK\x05\x06) appended after the PNG data, extracts the trailing archive to a temp directory, and spawns the Python interpreter detached against the extracted AppHost/main.py with a DAS_STAGED environment variable used as a reentry guard. All errors are swallowed to keep the operation silent. The payload host is not the publisher's own domain, the URL is unversioned and not integrity-checked (no hash/signature), and the ZIP-appended-to-PNG packaging is a covert channel intended to disguise executable content as an image asset. A source-comment in setup.py explicitly acknowledges that module-level code runs in-process during PEP 517 wheel builds and states the intent to keep the fetch silent and non-blocking, so the dropper fires automatically on pip install with no further user action.

During installation package fetches code hidden in an image containing a Python application with a native extension module. This module holds an obfuscated infostealer which collects sensitive data and exfiltrates them to a C2 server retrieved from transaction history in the Polygon blockchain.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-09-donutautosellsrc

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• infostealer

• Downloads and executes a remote executable.

• obfuscation

• malware

• native-extension

• steganography

• c2-in-blockchain

• The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.