Which versions of ditenv are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of ditenv are flagged malicious: 0.0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate ditenv if I installed it?

ditenv is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed ditenv — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If ditenv was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is ditenv part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — ditenv is associated with the 2026-06-ip-rotat, IN-MAL-2026-007454 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find ditenv across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ditenv (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ditenv across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

ditenvPyPI

Malicious code in ditenv (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6381

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall ditenv

What this malware does

setup.py overrides the install and egg_info commands with a RunCommand() class that fires unconditionally on pip install or pip download. The override reads the entire process environment via os.environ, serializes every key=value pair, captures the output of ps -elf, and POSTs the combined payload over plaintext HTTP via curl to a hardcoded interactsh/OAST subdomain (gjampdwmdjmppwedtkpbbdkq05f6iiz6r.oast.fun). On developer machines and CI runners, the captured environment routinely contains AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GH_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, PYPI_TOKEN, and similar credentials, all of which are leaked to an arbitrary attacker-controlled callback host. The package name is suggestive of a dotenv typosquat and the README self-identifies as a proof-of-concept; a comment claims the code is 'for research not for doing any harmful activity', but the cover story does not change the fact that any installer is subjected to live credential theft.

During installation, the package exfiltrates env variables

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-ip-rotat

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
exfiltration-env-variables
typosquatting

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

6d0048d35301edad3a673cfd44c244a805586b25d3027758738aa8939099f1cc

f0a52dbba9abeff2c606bcbc862027da259fcbd3938c827abfdbdb06ba801ecb

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ditenv (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ditenv across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ditenv is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If ditenv was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ditenv before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. ditenv on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-ip-rotatIN-MAL-2026-007454

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks ditenv-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring