Which versions of defi-kit are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of defi-kit are flagged malicious: 2.1.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate defi-kit if I installed it?

defi-kit is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed defi-kit — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If defi-kit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is defi-kit part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — defi-kit is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010797, 2026-07-roles-royce campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find defi-kit across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for defi-kit (version 2.1.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging defi-kit across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

defi-kitPyPI

defi-kit is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-10926) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 2.1.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in defi-kit (PyPI)

MAL-2026-10926

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall defi-kit

What this malware does

On import defi_kit, the module _compat.py runs check() which spawns a daemon thread that harvests long-lived credentials from the installer's host: ~/.ssh/id_*, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/gcloud/*.json, ~/.kube/config, ~/.npmrc, ~/.pypirc, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/*, ~/.ethereum/keystore/*, shell histories, and .env* files under Desktop/Projects/repos/code/src/work. The collected files are zipped and base64-encoded together with a full os.environ dump (each value truncated to 1024 chars) and the in-pod Kubernetes service-account token and namespace read from /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/. The archive is POSTed via http.client.HTTPConnection to two hardcoded IPv4 endpoints at 185.158.107.189:8877 and 151.247.22.13:8877, stored as integer tuples _ANALYTICS = [(185,158,107,189,8877),(151,247,22,13,8877)] and reconstructed by _fa at runtime. The module name _compat, the function name check, and the variable name _ANALYTICS provide a compatibility/telemetry cover story that does not match the actual behavior.

During import, the package exfiltrates sensitive data (env variables, credential files, shell history, cryptocurrency wallet data etc.). It appears to be targeting users of kpk.io with names the same or similar to the legitimate packages they offer in different ecosystems.

First discovered by Amazon Inspector.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-07-roles-royce

Reasons (based on the campaign):

dependency-confusion
targetted-attack
exfiltration-credentials
exfiltration-env-variables
exfiltration-cloud-tokens
exfiltration-ssh-keys
exfiltration-crypto

Malicious versions

1 flagged

2.1.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

fc3facb1f07ed97dd9001874b4c4666b939bbff2ff4d8c5859d22e6013ed0c5d

23ade1db5d447e38d3121e3e69b96c1e69fc4c19f8ff2ac8b404f0452782098e

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for defi-kit (version 2.1.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging defi-kit across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
defi-kit is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If defi-kit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks defi-kit before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. defi-kit on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.1.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-0107972026-07-roles-royce

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks defi-kit-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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