Which versions of deepsolid are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of deepsolid are flagged malicious: 99.6. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate deepsolid if I installed it?

deepsolid is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed deepsolid — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If deepsolid was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is deepsolid part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — deepsolid is associated with the 2024-11-byted-dast campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find deepsolid across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for deepsolid (version 99.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging deepsolid across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

deepsolidPyPI

Malicious code in deepsolid (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-10821

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall deepsolid

What this malware does

A campaign of probably pentest packages flooding PYPI. Installing the package or importing the module triggers reporting basic info like hostname, path and the username to the package author. There is no other purpose of the package.

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: 2024-11-byted-dast

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
typosquatting
dependency-confusion

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'deepsolid' @ 99.6 (pypi) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

99.6

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

ad9960d8f8c7e3409679b949bfbfbb9eec23354563e5af20930235fe8f6efc58

4172aeb7bdbd7c050b411c8fa27ad2a59fcf5cb65d4e049d0944a04998495b4d

bd495f31431e621d5ce9440e408d5b86e69cf6545ab1cff1eff26ff87b0a4d08

4770b5cf7e9e664a6225148d94fc040feeaafe0f7a13bf3efc9969999f3da077

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for deepsolid (version 99.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging deepsolid across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
deepsolid is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If deepsolid was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks deepsolid before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. deepsolid on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 99.6 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2024-11-byted-dast

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks deepsolid-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring