datacamp-lightPyPI
Malicious code in datacamp-light (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
datacamp-light 99.0.0 impersonates DataCamp's internal package (name='datacamp-light', author='DataCamp', url='https://github.com/datacamp/datacamp-light', anomalous version 99.0.0 — the canonical dependency-confusion bait shape). setup.py defines an exfiltrate() function and invokes it unconditionally at top level, so it fires during pip install. The function collects hostname, current working directory, platform, Python version, and USER/USERNAME environment variables, JSON-encodes them, and POSTs them via urllib.request.urlopen to https://z39gspa3.pingback.sh/c. Any installer whose resolver picks up this public artifact (the intent of the 99.0.0 version pin) leaks host and user identifiers to the pingback domain. Even though the package self-labels as a 'PoC,' the published artifact actively phones home from any machine that installs it.
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for datacamp-light (version 99.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging datacamp-light across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
datacamp-light is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If datacamp-light was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks datacamp-light before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks datacamp-light-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.