d4rktgPyPI
Malicious code in d4rktg (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The library's sole authorization primitive, CustomFilters.authorize() in d4rk/Utils/_filters.py, OR's the installer-supplied owner_id and sudo_users list with a hardcoded Telegram user ID 7859877609 (lines 48-53). Any developer who installs this package to build a Telegram bot and uses the library's advertised authorize() filter to gate owner/admin commands silently grants Telegram account 7859877609 the same privileges as the bot's declared owner — including whatever privileged actions the bot exposes (admin commands, sudo commands, shell-style handlers common in Telegram bot frameworks). The bypass is not documented, cannot be disabled through configuration, and is reachable through normal use of the library's public API. This is a hidden persistent-access backdoor against the installer's deployed bot, not author self-harm: the harm flows from the installer to an account under the package author's (or a third party's) control.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for d4rktg (version 1.2.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging d4rktg across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
d4rktg establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If d4rktg was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks d4rktg before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks d4rktg-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.