ctf-toolkitPyPI
Malicious code in ctf-toolkit (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package states to contain a modified curl library to allow low-level request modifications. However, there is also undisclosed malicious behavior:
- The package installs a .pth file directly in the site-packages directory, effectively running a special code on each Python usage.
- This code performs "TLS context warm-up" by contacting a URL (Github) in the background, in a separate process; this is suspicious on its own as it's unclear how a separate process can warm up further requests in the main process, but...
- ...besides the URL given in the code above, the library always contacts a hardcoded URL, identifying itself as a VPN client.
Additionally, there is no source code of the modified library anywhere, and the related Github hosting the package code account is 1-day old.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-02-ctf-toolkit
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ctf-toolkit (version 0.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ctf-toolkit across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ctf-toolkit is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If ctf-toolkit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ctf-toolkit before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · analyst
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ctf-toolkit-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.