cosmos-cudaPyPI
cosmos-cuda is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-10617) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 9999.0.0, 9999.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in cosmos-cuda (PyPI)
What this malware does
The sdist-only package cosmos-cuda 9999.0.0 executes a beacon function _beacon('build') from setup.py during sdist build/install and _beacon('import') from cosmos_cuda/init.py at import. Both code paths collect the installer's hostname, current username, and current working directory, then transmit them to the hardcoded external host oob.asyncrun.in via a DNS lookup of a crafted FQDN (socket.getaddrinfo) and via an HTTPS/HTTP GET request (urllib.request.urlopen). The package ships only as an sdist and uses version 9999.0.0 so that pip's highest-version resolution selects it when a name collision exists against an internal package resolved through --extra-index-url, forcing setup.py execution during install and producing arbitrary code execution and exfiltration on installers whose environment resolves the name.
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cosmos-cuda (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cosmos-cuda across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cosmos-cuda is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If cosmos-cuda was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cosmos-cuda before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cosmos-cuda-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.