confighubPyPI
Malicious code in confighub (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
confighub 7.0.1 declares install_requires=['procwire'] and imports procwire at package load in init.py under a version gate that silently swallows ImportError (try: import procwire as _pw except ImportError: pass). procwire is not referenced anywhere in confighub's own code (loader.py, manager.py) and is not mentioned in the README or API documentation. confighub's own code is benign, but installing confighub forces resolution and import of an undocumented sibling package whose behavior determines the actual installer-side risk. If procwire is attacker-controlled or malicious, confighub acts as the delivery vector; if procwire is a benign helper, this is only a documentation/hygiene issue. Human review of procwire itself is required to determine whether this is a dependency-based dropper or an undisclosed but benign split.
This package depends on malicious 'procwire', which starts malicious actions during installation.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-procwire
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
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Downloads and executes a remote executable.
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obfuscation
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The malicious code is intentionally included in a dependency of the package
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malware
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steganography
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for confighub (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging confighub across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
confighub is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If confighub was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks confighub before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks confighub-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.