Which versions of compressa are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of compressa are flagged malicious: 94.6. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate compressa if I installed it?

compressa is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed compressa — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If compressa was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is compressa part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — compressa is associated with the 2024-11-byted-dast campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find compressa across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for compressa (version 94.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging compressa across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

compressaPyPI

Malicious code in compressa (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-10638

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall compressa

What this malware does

A campaign of probably pentest packages flooding PYPI. Installing the package or importing the module triggers reporting basic info like hostname, path and the username to the package author. There is no other purpose of the package.

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: 2024-11-byted-dast

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
typosquatting
dependency-confusion

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'compressa' @ 94.6 (pypi) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

94.6

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

0e1be6f41102254074ebf5487ee4d85435833385dbf112b29b2c116cfae39f45

f42a4b16178c0c05741eac93345ccaa2705339ba276936b21e9935584e65bd6e

0cabf2172928d772d626ba857400e15f273fc925a9ff75e7f655ce461e9be498

c44274d1df026b63882711e1e55abc19558031f16f73d77a5867508b5c717590

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for compressa (version 94.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging compressa across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
compressa is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If compressa was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks compressa before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. compressa on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 94.6 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2024-11-byted-dast

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks compressa-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring