clearml-truen-patchPyPI
Malicious code in clearml-truen-patch (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
This package is published as clearml-truen-patch but its PKG-INFO/setup.py declare Author=ClearML, Author-email=[email protected], and Home-page=https://github.com/clearml/clearml, falsely presenting it as a first-party release of the legitimate ClearML SDK. The actual modifications are by an unrelated third party (Korean-language # truen patch: comments in datasets/dataset.py:3588). At install time, setup.py's PostInstall hook calls _apply_overlay() which invokes clearml_truen_patch._install.run(force=True); that function locates the on-disk clearml/ directory of the legitimate clearml package in site-packages and uses shutil.copy2 to copy this package's files (including backend_api/session.py, task.py, model.py, storage/helper.py) over clearml's installed files. After install, import clearml resolves to the third-party author's code instead of upstream ClearML. The package additionally ships clearml_truen_patch.pth, which is auto-loaded by site.py at every Python interpreter startup and runs import clearml_truen_patch._autoapply. That module calls _install.run(force=True) whenever needs_apply() detects that clearml's files differ from this package's source fingerprint, so any attempt by the user to reinstall or repair clearml to restore upstream code is silently reverted on the next Python invocation. The combination — falsified publisher identity, install-time overwrite of another publisher's installed package, and a self-healing.pth persistence mechanism — gives the third-party author durable control over the clearml import surface on every installer's machine. Even if the current overlay diff is benign, any future release can trojan a widely used ML SDK with no further consent from installers.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for clearml-truen-patch (version 2.1.3.post6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging clearml-truen-patch across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove clearml-truen-patch from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If clearml-truen-patch was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks clearml-truen-patch before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks clearml-truen-patch-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.