cipherflowPyPI
Malicious code in cipherflow (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
cipherflow advertises itself as a zero-dependency pure-Python AES/DES library, but cipherflow/_environ.py contains a multi-layer-obfuscated payload that is decoded and passed directly to exec(). The blob is base85-decoded, XOR'd against a 32-byte key, then zlib-decompressed before being executed: exec(zlib.decompress(bytes(__[i]^_[i%len(_)] for i in range(len(__)))).decode()) with __ = base64.b85decode(b'MJ*(r4W!?y...'). This payload is exposed via cipherflow.setup_env() (declared in all), whose docstring translates to 'download and execute external environment'. The function is not mentioned anywhere in the README/PKG-INFO. The combination of triple-stacked encoding (base85 + XOR + zlib) terminating in exec(), placement inside a cover-named module (_environ.py / setup_env), and intentional omission from documentation are canonical signals of hidden malicious code execution. Any consumer who imports cipherflow and invokes setup_env() — or any downstream code that does so — runs whatever bytes the author chose to hide, with full process privileges.
The package contains obfuscated code to download executables from a typosquatted domain.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-cipherflow
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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obfuscation
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Downloads and executes a remote executable.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cipherflow (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cipherflow across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cipherflow is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If cipherflow was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cipherflow before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · analyst
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cipherflow-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.