celium-collateral-upgradePyPI
Malicious code in celium-collateral-upgrade (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
This is a typosquatting/dependency confusion package that is part of a campaign embedding malicious code but was found before the malicious code was injected.
Packages in this campaign clone a legitimate library and add a hidden code that downloads a malicious script. The script then downloads an archive with malicious executable in the version appropriate to the system architecture, and ensures persistency by adding automatically started service entries. The remote code is a Go-based inforstealer and backdoor previously attributed to Nordkorean cybercrime activities. In this campaign, the malicious code is not immediately introduced in the typosquatted package, but added with an update.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-01-gztensor-cli
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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crypto-related
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action-hidden-in-lib-usage
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Downloads and executes a remote executable.
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clones-real-package
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peristence-autorun
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typosquatting
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obfuscation
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backdoor
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infostealer
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for celium-collateral-upgrade (version 1.1.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging celium-collateral-upgrade across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
celium-collateral-upgrade is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If celium-collateral-upgrade was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks celium-collateral-upgrade before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks celium-collateral-upgrade-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.