Which versions of btcflip are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of btcflip are flagged malicious: 0.1.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate btcflip if I installed it?

btcflip is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed btcflip — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If btcflip was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is btcflip part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — btcflip is associated with the 2026-08-kotanku, IN-MAL-2026-017210 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find btcflip across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for btcflip (version 0.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging btcflip across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

btcflipPyPI

btcflip is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-13681) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 0.1.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in btcflip (PyPI)

MAL-2026-13681

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall btcflip

What this malware does

The package advertises itself as an HTTP speed-up library, but on import it archives the user's Monero wallet directory (C:\Users<user>\Documents\Monero on Windows, /home/<user>/Monero on Linux) and uploads the archive to a hardcoded Telegram bot via api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendDocument (chat_id -5044692933). The destination bot token and wallet paths are stored as base64 blobs (constants TK, XMR_WIN, XMR_LINUX) and decoded at runtime to conceal the exfiltration target. The exfil routine is invoked at module top level, so any import btcflip (which loads the inner kotoraka module) triggers wallet theft. The code also terminates feather/monero processes to release file locks before archiving. The stated purpose of the package is unrelated to Monero wallets and is a cover story for wallet theft.

During import, the package exfiltrates cryptocurrency wallet files.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-08-kotanku

Reasons (based on the campaign):

exfiltration-crypto
uses-telegram-bot

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

2b305ae4851e877fcea4950e019342d31782bde7e3c49d11847e2ede65776f78

e4271f738e49ead6113a249ca949232cad9664db210319a097b56385b1942970

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for btcflip (version 0.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging btcflip across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
btcflip is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If btcflip was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks btcflip before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. btcflip on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-08-kotankuIN-MAL-2026-017210

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks btcflip-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database