bt-burn-watchPyPI
Malicious code in bt-burn-watch (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package advertises Bittensor subnet burn-rate monitoring but the compiled core module's own docstring describes itself as a 'clipboard logger + Bittensor subnet burn rate monitoring' tool. defaults.env ships a hardcoded Telegram bot token (8666228137:AAF_NLMrow4cDf3uEJCl3JY7DeBHtovd1TU) and chat id (8766781014) commented 'Bundled for all pip install users'. When the user runs the documented bittensor-burn-watch install CLI, the package installs persistence via Task Scheduler (Windows), systemd (Linux) or LaunchAgent (macOS), polls the OS clipboard, deduplicates each unique string via a local SQLite store, and POSTs every new clipboard entry to api.telegram.org under the author's bot. The compiled core exposes clipboard_already_sent, _claim_clipboard_text, _normalize_clipboard_text, _clipboard_fingerprint, plus a Win32-API clipboard reader whose own docstring boasts 'no window flash' (anti-detection), and on Linux silently apt/dnf/pacman-installs wl-clipboard/xclip without prompting. The package is shipped as Cython-compiled.so files only (no Python source) for a tool that does nothing more than call a public REST API and send Telegram messages — compilation here exists to hide the clipboard-capture surface from casual pip download && grep audits. Given the Bittensor user base, clipboard contents typically include TAO wallet seed phrases, private keys, and exchange API keys. defaults.env also bundles the author's own taostats API key for all installers to consume.
The package contains code to steal clipboard content to a predefined remote location. If run in the right way, the code will periodically check the clipboard and if the content matches the pattern, exfiltrates it. Early versions contain this behavior mentioned in the README. The targeted data are likely cryptocurrency secret phrases.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-clip-logger
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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clipboard-stealing
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crypto-related
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bt-burn-watch (version 1.4.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bt-burn-watch across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bt-burn-watch is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If bt-burn-watch was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bt-burn-watch before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bt-burn-watch-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.