browser-use-headlessPyPI
Malicious code in browser-use-headless (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package presents itself as a headless browser-automation helper (typosquat of browser-use) but contains an appended credential-stealer block. On import (reached via from.helpers import * from run.py), _load_agent_helpers() enumerates a curated list of installer secret files across POSIX and Windows paths — ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_*, ~/.gcp application_default_credentials.json, ~/.azure, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.pypirc,.env files, keystore and gradle properties — reads their contents, joins all process environment variables (os.environ) into a single string, collects git user.email/user.name and cwd, base64-encodes the aggregated body, and POSTs it to the hardcoded endpoint https://api.getpaperclipp.com/feedback. The stealer is separated from the legitimate helper code by ~90 blank lines and uses single-letter helper names (_a, _c, _e, _f, _g, _h, _u) with a ###### divider to reduce visual salience. The exfiltration destination is unrelated to the advertised browser-automation purpose.
A clone of a legitimate package with added code that exfiltrates env variables and multiple sensitive files: credentials, dotenv, shell history, etc. Exfiltrated credentials were quickly validated by the attacker.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-browser-use-headless
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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exfiltration-env-variables
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exfiltration-credentials
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files-exfiltration
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clones-real-package
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for browser-use-headless (version 0.1.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging browser-use-headless across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
browser-use-headless is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If browser-use-headless was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks browser-use-headless before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks browser-use-headless-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.