Which versions of bramin are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of bramin are flagged malicious: 0.0.2, 0.0.3, 0.0.4. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate bramin if I installed it?

bramin is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed bramin — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If bramin was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is bramin part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — bramin is associated with the 2026-06-compr-woodpecker, IN-MAL-2026-005820 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find bramin across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bramin (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bramin across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

braminPyPI

Malicious code in bramin (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5280

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall bramin

What this malware does

bramin ships a bramin-setup.pth file that Python auto-executes at every interpreter startup (system-wide, not only when bramin is imported). The.pth contains a single-line obfuscated payload using single-letter aliases (_O, _T, _G, _o, _s, _u, _p, _y, _b, _z, _zf) that, on first run, downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-<platform>-<arch>.zip, stages the binary to /tmp/b/bun, chmods it executable, and invokes bun run against a sibling _index.js discovered via dirname(__file__) with a glob fallback. A guard file /tmp/.bun_ran ensures the dropper fires only once per machine to evade observation. Several signals confirm malicious intent: (1) the package advertises itself only as a 'pipe operator syntax' Python library and has no legitimate need for a JavaScript runtime; (2) _index.js is not listed in the wheel's RECORD manifest, meaning the executed JS payload is smuggled in or supplied by a later/sibling drop and is not covered by the distribution's integrity metadata; (3) __init__.py declares __version__ = '0.0.1' while the dist-info is 0.0.3, a version-drift fingerprint consistent with an additive-only republish bolting the dropper onto a previously legitimate release; (4) the obfuscation shape (chained exec() of a one-line string with aliased imports) has no benign explanation for a.pth file, whose legitimate purpose is sys.path mutation. Installer impact: arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript execution on the installer's machine on the very next Python invocation after pip install bramin, with the executed bytes (_index.js) outside the wheel's signed manifest and therefore mutable by the attacker at any time.

Versions 0.0.2, 0.0.3, 0.0.4 were compromised.

Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution.

It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker

Reasons (based on the campaign):

compromised-package
exfiltration-env-variables
exfiltration-cloud-tokens
exfiltration-credentials
abuses-pth
obfuscation
infostealer
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
exfiltration-crypto
files-exfiltration
destructive-actions

Malicious versions

3 flagged

0.0.20.0.30.0.4

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

28d9bf945559e6c3defecd55f9f3af3bb8b6dc073ad2b039f7c4e1eb6947c0f5

5f6116f7e533ec9477c087aa51a01a51f12bbcb362723a100b9779752d55697f

8d6946e4eefd247489fdfc7129175201ff9048eef20090da047e7c786a77d1da

3c3f7bc91d1fdf4046c296cb923cdbc52953de258f33424a0966ac60146134a3

5933ebb330070d47683cbb0b04b4a8805db94d845d0efde3a592e178a0092769

1fb2ac40fcb4626c5e7dea5e26951bc0965b39a1eb721c1a8f23846f421a5827

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bramin (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bramin across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bramin is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If bramin was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bramin before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. bramin on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.0.2, 0.0.3, 0.0.4 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-compr-woodpeckerIN-MAL-2026-005820

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks bramin-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring