boto4PyPI
boto4 is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-14349) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in boto4 (PyPI)
What this malware does
setup.py defines a custom setuptools install command (EjecutaElf) that base64-decodes a ~17MB embedded Linux ELF, writes it to /tmp/.systemd-helper, chmods 0755, and spawns it via subprocess.Popen during pip install on Linux. The tarball's importable package is a stub named reques with an empty init.py, and PKG-INFO advertises the project as an HTTP library for humans (unofficial fix) authored by Anonymous, requiring requests — a cover story that lures installers looking for a requests-related fix while the sole functional behavior is native-code execution on the installer's host at install time. Package name boto4 and internal directory reques are lookalikes for boto3/requests.
During installation, package executes an embedded executable. The executable is capable of executing remote commands, establishing persistence, cryptomining, exfiltrating basic data, further network scanning and worm-style propagation. Actions are controlled via a Telegram bot.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-08-boto4
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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cryptominer
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worm
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network-scan
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The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
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uses-telegram-bot
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persistence
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The package contains code to execute remote commands (probably limited to a specific set) on the victim's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for boto4 (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging boto4 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
boto4 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If boto4 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks boto4 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks boto4-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.