boardflowPyPI
Malicious code in boardflow (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On pip install boardflow, setup.py spawns a background thread that fetches http://pooron.org/test.exe over plain HTTP into the OS temp directory and executes it via subprocess.Popen with shell=True, suppressing stdout/stderr. The destination domain is unrelated to the package's advertised purpose (a CLI Kanban tool), the URL is unpinned and unverified (no hash, no signature, plain HTTP allowing MITM tampering), and the fetched.exe is attacker-controlled content executed with the privileges of the installing user. This is a classic install-time dropper that yields arbitrary remote code execution on every installer's machine.
During installation, package downloads and executes a remote executable identified as infostealer. The executable contains a VSCode extension with a modified code variant that during initialization downloads and executes a JS script from hardcoded location. During analysis, the script was inaccessible.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-boardflow
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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infostealer
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
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Downloads and executes a remote executable.
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malware
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for boardflow (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging boardflow across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
boardflow is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If boardflow was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks boardflow before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks boardflow-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.