bittensor-emission-trackerPyPI
Malicious code in bittensor-emission-tracker (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package advertises Bittensor subnet burn-rate monitoring but ships a Cython-compiled darwin.so (core.cpython-310-darwin.so) containing an undocumented clipboard-monitoring daemon. Strings in the binary reveal functions _normalize_clipboard_text, _clipboard_fingerprint, _valid_clipboard_text, and docstrings 'Start clipboard daemon if not running', 'Exclusive lock so only one _run daemon polls clipboard', 'Send Telegram for a phrase. Skips if already sent.', and 'Atomically claim text (SQLite). Returns False if already sent.' — a polling clipboard scraper that deduplicates captured phrases via SQLite and ships each new one to Telegram. The bundled bittensor_emission_tracker/defaults.env hardcodes TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN=8666228137:AAF_NLMrow4cDf3uEJCl3JY7DeBHtovd1TU and TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID=8766781014 as the default exfiltration sink for every installer who does not manually override via install --telegram_token. The package's install subcommand registers cross-platform autostart (Windows Task Scheduler with battery/time-limit overrides, Linux systemd user service, macOS LaunchAgent) so the daemon persists across reboots and logins. Distribution as a darwin-only compiled.so with no.pyx source in the wheel conceals the clipboard code path from casual inspection while the README only documents burn-rate alerts. Installing or running this package causes long-term, reboot-persistent exfiltration of any sensitive text the user copies (passwords, seed phrases, API keys, private messages) to the author's Telegram channel.
The package contains code to steal clipboard content to a predefined remote location. If run in the right way, the code will periodically check the clipboard and if the content matches the pattern, exfiltrates it. The targeted data are likely cryptocurrency secret seed phrases.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-clip-logger
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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clipboard-stealing
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crypto-related
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bittensor-emission-tracker (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bittensor-emission-tracker across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bittensor-emission-tracker is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If bittensor-emission-tracker was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bittensor-emission-tracker before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bittensor-emission-tracker-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.