bittensor-burn-monitorPyPI
bittensor-burn-monitor is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-5311) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.5.0, 1.5.3, 1.5.5…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bittensor-burn-monitor (PyPI)
What this malware does
bittensor-burn-monitor advertises itself as a Bittensor subnet burn-rate monitor but ships a covert clipboard logger that exfiltrates installers' clipboard contents to a hardcoded Telegram destination. The package's logic is shipped only as compiled Cython binaries (bittensor_burn_watch/core.cpython-310-.so, burn_watch.cpython-310-.so) with a thin init.py that re-exports main; no Python source is provided. The compiled module's own internal documentation describes it as a 'clipboard logger', exposes routines to 'Read clipboard via Win32 API', 'Pick the first working Linux clipboard backend', and run an exclusive daemon that polls the clipboard and sends each capture as a Telegram message. A bundled defaults.env hardcodes a single attacker-controlled bot token and chat ID (TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN=8666228137:AAF_NLMrow4cDf3uEJCl3JY7DeBHtovd1TU, TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID=8766781014) so every installer reports to the same destination. The package additionally installs cross-platform persistence so the clipboard daemon survives reboots and respawns if killed — Windows Task Scheduler entries configured to run regardless of battery/time limits with a 15-minute watchdog, a Linux systemd user service + timer, and a macOS LaunchAgent with KeepAlive — and on Linux it silently invokes apt/dnf/pacman to install wl-clipboard/xclip without user prompt to enable clipboard access. Targets Bittensor subnet operators, whose clipboards routinely contain wallet mnemonics, validator hotkeys, and API tokens. Clipboard capture, the Telegram destination, and the autostart persistence are all undisclosed in the README.
The package contains code to steal clipboard content to a predefined remote location. If run in the right way, the code will periodically check the clipboard and if the content matches the pattern, exfiltrates it. Early versions contain this behavior mentioned in the README. The targeted data are likely cryptocurrency secret phrases.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-clip-logger
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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clipboard-stealing
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crypto-related
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bittensor-burn-monitor (7 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bittensor-burn-monitor across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bittensor-burn-monitor is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If bittensor-burn-monitor was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bittensor-burn-monitor before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bittensor-burn-monitor-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.