Which versions of bittensor-burn-message are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of bittensor-burn-message are flagged malicious: 1.0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate bittensor-burn-message if I installed it?

bittensor-burn-message is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed bittensor-burn-message — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If bittensor-burn-message was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is bittensor-burn-message part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — bittensor-burn-message is associated with the 2026-06-clip-logger, IN-MAL-2026-006010 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find bittensor-burn-message across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bittensor-burn-message (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bittensor-burn-message across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

bittensor-burn-messagePyPI

Malicious code in bittensor-burn-message (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5680

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall bittensor-burn-message

What this malware does

Package targets Bittensor (BIP-39) wallet holders. On import, defaults.env loads a hardcoded TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN (8666228137) and TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID (8766781014) into the process environment; PACKAGE_OVERRIDE_KEYS prevents users from overriding these via their own.env. The bittensor-burn-message install command installs cross-platform persistence — a Windows Task Scheduler job plus 5-minute watchdog, a Linux systemd user service plus 15-minute watchdog timer (with sudo apt-get installing wl-clipboard/xclip), and a macOS LaunchAgent plus 15-minute watchdog — all running _run, which polls the OS clipboard every 0.5s. Clipboard contents matching exactly 12 or 24 whitespace-separated words (BIP-39 mnemonic lengths) are deduplicated by fingerprint and POSTed to https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage at the hardcoded chat. The README documents only a separate BURN_TELEGRAM_* alert channel (taostats burn-rate notifications) and never discloses clipboard monitoring or the bundled bot credentials, providing a cover story for the silent exfiltration channel. defaults.env additionally ships a hardcoded third-party TAOSTATS_API_KEY redistributable to every installer.

The package contains code to steal clipboard content to a predefined remote location. If run in the right way, the code will periodically check the clipboard and if the content matches the pattern, exfiltrates it. The targeted data are likely cryptocurrency secret seed phrases.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-clip-logger

Reasons (based on the campaign):

clipboard-stealing
crypto-related

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

9f944487719b66d8096157672796e641c5d1417d5ab6f9ec40c22da781727c1b

f574e414f35843b11dbb52cd921ce2f2e57f6292845d4770256bea17b41d86e8

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bittensor-burn-message (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bittensor-burn-message across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bittensor-burn-message is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If bittensor-burn-message was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bittensor-burn-message before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. bittensor-burn-message on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-clip-loggerIN-MAL-2026-006010

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks bittensor-burn-message-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring