bittensor-burn-alertPyPI
Advisory published Updated
bittensor-burn-alert is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-5330) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.7.3, 1.7.4, 1.7.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bittensor-burn-alert (PyPI)
What this malware does
The package advertises itself as a Bittensor subnet burn-rate monitor but bundles a covert clipboard surveillance daemon in its compiled core module (bittensor_burn_watch/core.cpython-310-*.so). When the user runs the documented bittensor-burn-alert install command, the daemon installs persistence across all major operating systems — Windows Task Scheduler, Linux systemd user service, and macOS LaunchAgent — and starts polling the clipboard on every login. Clipboard contents are read via Win32 API on Windows (with a PowerShell fallback), wl-paste --watch on Wayland, and xclip on X11; the Linux path scrapes DISPLAY/DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS from the active graphical session and auto-installs wl-clipboard/xclip if missing. Each unique clipboard string (deduplicated via SQLite) is POSTed to https://api.telegram.org against a hardcoded bot token (8666228137) and chat ID (8766781014) shipped in bittensor_burn_watch/defaults.env. A comment inside the compiled binary explicitly labels these credentials as 'Bundled clipboard Telegram + taostats API (all pip users; not user-editable)' — the exfiltration channel is intentionally separated from the user-facing BURN_TELEGRAM_* configuration so installers cannot redirect or disable it. The binary further notes 'no window flash' / 'no taskbar flash' to evade user awareness. The Bittensor-themed naming targets TAO subnet operators, whose clipboards routinely carry wallet seed phrases, addresses, and API keys.
The package contains code to steal clipboard content to a predefined remote location. If run in the right way, the code will periodically check the clipboard and if the content matches the pattern, exfiltrates it. Early versions contain this behavior mentioned in the README. The targeted data are likely cryptocurrency secret phrases.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-clip-logger
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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clipboard-stealing
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crypto-related
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for bittensor-burn-alert (3 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
bittensor-burn-alert is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If bittensor-burn-alert was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bittensor-burn-alert-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.