Which versions of bittensor-burn are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of bittensor-burn are flagged malicious: 1.8.0, 1.8.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate bittensor-burn if I installed it?

bittensor-burn is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed bittensor-burn — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If bittensor-burn was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is bittensor-burn part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — bittensor-burn is associated with the 2026-06-clip-logger, IN-MAL-2026-005650 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find bittensor-burn across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bittensor-burn (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bittensor-burn across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

bittensor-burnPyPI

Malicious code in bittensor-burn (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5331

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall bittensor-burn

What this malware does

The package markets itself as a Bittensor burn-rate monitor but ships a compiled native module (bittensor_burn_watch/core.cpython-*.so) that reads the installer's system clipboard on Linux (wl-paste/xclip), macOS, and Windows (Win32 API with a PowerShell fallback) and forwards every unique clipboard string to a hardcoded Telegram chat. The Telegram bot token and chat ID are bundled in bittensor_burn_watch/defaults.env (TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN=8666228137:..., TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID=8766781014, labelled 'admin Telegram' / 'clipboard alerts'), so the destination is fixed by the author rather than configured by the installer — even though the README instructs users to configure their own bot. The compiled module contains explicit stealth engineering: comments such as 'Read clipboard via Win32 API; PowerShell fallback if needed (no window flash)' and 'never mix X11 clients into a Wayland session (xclip flashes the taskbar)' show deliberate effort to avoid user-visible indicators. Persistence is established system-wide (Windows Task Scheduler logon entry plus 15-minute watchdog, a systemd user service on Linux, and a LaunchAgent KeepAlive on macOS), so the clipboard logger runs continuously after install. The Bittensor-themed package name targets crypto/AI users likely to paste wallet seed phrases, exchange API keys, and TAO addresses — high-value secrets for the operator of the receiving Telegram chat. A bundled Taostats API key (TAOSTATS_API_KEY=tao-e9b3d1d9-...) is a secondary concern (quota abuse against api.taostats.io) but is not the primary harm.

The package contains code to steal clipboard content to a predefined remote location. If run in the right way, the code will periodically check the clipboard and if the content matches the pattern, exfiltrates it. The targeted data are likely cryptocurrency secret seed phrases.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-clip-logger

Reasons (based on the campaign):

clipboard-stealing
crypto-related

Malicious versions

2 flagged

1.8.01.8.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

75331af1d73717c0eb5535938c91df41c17f5b205aa2e1545906527b0ff1c5a0

cdf215dbadd53a3eea10b66e2e7ebfb16a4aa78b10adc818ae16d262995b6e36

99f546bfd362dae8aed49775bf13961c3540c29ef6fa54f484bf57e978d775be

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bittensor-burn (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bittensor-burn across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bittensor-burn is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If bittensor-burn was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bittensor-burn before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. bittensor-burn on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.8.0, 1.8.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-clip-loggerIN-MAL-2026-005650

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks bittensor-burn-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring