beautifytextPyPI
Advisory published Updated
beautifytext is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-17417) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.3, 1.0.4, 1.0.7). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in beautifytext (PyPI)
What this malware does
beautifytext 1.0.3 imports beautifyText/_compat.py from its init.py and from a setup.py install hook. That module starts a detached background process that registers the host (hostname, user, OS, working directory) with https://bleodw.wisp.uno, then polls it for jobs to run shell commands or read and write files, and posts the results back.
beautifyText 1.0.3 is a backdoor disguised as a text utility. On import beautifyText, the package spawns a detached background Python process (via a module named _compat) that decodes a base64-obfuscated C2 URL (https://bleodw.wisp.uno) and enters a long-poll loop against /work/{id}. The command channel implements three job kinds: exec runs arbitrary shell commands via subprocess with shell=True, pull reads arbitrary files from the installer's host, and push writes arbitrary files to the installer's host, with results POSTed back to /result. On registration, host metadata (hostname, OS/release, Python version, USER/USERNAME, current working directory) is sent to /register, and /heartbeat maintains the session. setup.py installs an install and develop cmdclass override whose run() calls _post_install(), which imports beautifyText._compat and triggers the same beacon during pip install, so the backdoor activates on install even without a subsequent import. The C2 host is stored as a base64 literal (_HOST_B64 = aHR0cHM6Ly9ibGVvZHcud2lzcC51bm8=) and decoded at runtime to evade static string matching. The process is detached so it survives parent-process exit.
During import, the package silently spans a separate process that waits for and executes remote commands.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-beautifytext
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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rat
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The package contains code to execute remote commands (probably limited to a specific set) on the victim's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for beautifytext (3 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
beautifytext is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If beautifytext was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
- smiling-hyena · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks beautifytext-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.