Which versions of badgerdoc-storage are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of badgerdoc-storage are flagged malicious: 0.0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate badgerdoc-storage if I installed it?

badgerdoc-storage is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed badgerdoc-storage — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If badgerdoc-storage was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is badgerdoc-storage part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — badgerdoc-storage is associated with the RLMA-2025-02557, 2025-05-sl4x01 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find badgerdoc-storage across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for badgerdoc-storage (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging badgerdoc-storage across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

badgerdoc-storagePyPI

Malicious code in badgerdoc-storage (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2025-3740

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall badgerdoc-storage

What this malware does

Packages that seem to be created by a legit bug bounty hunter. Designed to look like created by different organisations, they contain a couple of data exfiltration (including all env variables) and potential remote code execution (though the URL seems not to serve any code).

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2025-05-sl4x01

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
exfiltration-env-variables
impersonation

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'badgerdoc-storage' @ 0.0.1 (pypi) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

e4cb1d64c1adc71d974cdd0d7efad753262eb0a666d9f284d988aaae9c506ff0

82498338aaf394016668c3918c1ecfe4c6120ca5ae5146092116a2c504dd6a65

52d2568604219dbc8a4a48c917a0f707bf57ccb7963033a6caa3f2b0e34a8901

57170ed58e2cf5e3b4b32f443ae555c7c040f2a395b3505837c90e06add93db5

b1ab3d93c1ab3b2d0072d4b6d0a5ebc639457b6837449894a2a0780782fc1440

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for badgerdoc-storage (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging badgerdoc-storage across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
badgerdoc-storage is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If badgerdoc-storage was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks badgerdoc-storage before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. badgerdoc-storage on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

RLMA-2025-025572025-05-sl4x01

References

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks badgerdoc-storage-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring