auto-backup-macosPyPI
Malicious code in auto-backup-macos (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package performs a "backup" of files to a remote location. This functionality is clearly described, but the user has no control over the remote location where the collected files are sent, as well as no access to the "backed up" data. They are uploaded to a hardcoded Gofile account and as the downloading links are not saved anywhere, only the package author has access to them. In newer versions, packages explicitly target files with passwords, mnemonics, keys and crypto tokens. Also the command history and content of the clipboard are exfiltrated.
Furthermore, packages are closely related to and used in multiple Github repositories about cryptocurrencies, and other attractive toolsets, like free AI. When a user sets up one of these repositories, the auto-backup* packages are automatically installed. They are set - through a covered steps - to run as a scheduled task or periodic service, and exfiltrate sensitive data.
As an example, https://github.com/oxmoei/BatchCall-dapp :
- Installation: https://github.com/oxmoei/BatchCall-dapp/blob/20dc21c96226481b3351ee477ad64e615a34b0c5/install.sh#L108
- next, a remote script is executed: https://github.com/oxmoei/BatchCall-dapp/blob/20dc21c96226481b3351ee477ad64e615a34b0c5/install.sh#L124C10-L124C103
- which then extracts base64-encoded scripts in the repository itself https://github.com/oxmoei/BatchCall-dapp/blob/20dc21c96226481b3351ee477ad64e615a34b0c5/.configs/config.ini#L22 and configures scheduled tasks/services/cronjobs/bashrc entries.
Scripts encoded in the repository call the "autobackup" command provided by auto-backup* Python packages. Effectively, the user's computer is infected with an infostealer.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-01-auto-backup
Reasons (based on the campaign):
-
files-exfiltration
-
infostealer
-
exfiltration-credentials
-
crypto-related
-
persistence
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for auto-backup-macos (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging auto-backup-macos across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
auto-backup-macos is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If auto-backup-macos was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks auto-backup-macos before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · analyst
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks auto-backup-macos-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.