Which versions of ateslassia are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of ateslassia are flagged malicious: 3.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate ateslassia if I installed it?

ateslassia is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed ateslassia — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If ateslassia was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is ateslassia part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — ateslassia is associated with the RLMA-2025-03521, GENERIC-questionable-pentest, RLUA-2026-00094 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find ateslassia across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ateslassia (version 3.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ateslassia across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

ateslassiaPyPI

Malicious code in ateslassia (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2025-6436

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall ateslassia

What this malware does

Generic campaign for all (likely) research / pentests, where the amount or art of collected data raises questions about the privacy, security and ethical side.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: GENERIC-questionable-pentest

Reasons (based on the campaign):

exfiltration-env-variables
exfiltration-generic
The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
typosquatting

Malicious versions

1 flagged

3.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

eb92dfaf5c591e729f97188a84d28c4d24353f1628f5de34a146627946cb19ae

666c311e823055a3492055e3ebda09fb732b5e37f38fd718c73180b59a732f43

7b3ae00037330440de3fd0b333720f254e1549b277a12df5d31fb7f70d771daa

5d9088ad5856d8fba760ecb176e03c301f53518278642205379db9c506fd20d6

5f639c9da6ce9d2f6bbadcc622386a9c35df8da51facbedd15517344365172dc

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ateslassia (version 3.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ateslassia across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ateslassia is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If ateslassia was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ateslassia before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. ateslassia on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 3.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

RLMA-2025-03521GENERIC-questionable-pentestRLUA-2026-00094

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks ateslassia-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring