Which versions of async-substrate-interface-upgrade are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of async-substrate-interface-upgrade are flagged malicious: 1.5.17. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate async-substrate-interface-upgrade if I installed it?

async-substrate-interface-upgrade is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed async-substrate-interface-upgrade — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If async-substrate-interface-upgrade was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is async-substrate-interface-upgrade part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — async-substrate-interface-upgrade is associated with the 2026-01-gztensor-cli campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find async-substrate-interface-upgrade across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for async-substrate-interface-upgrade (version 1.5.17). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging async-substrate-interface-upgrade across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

async-substrate-interface-upgradePyPI

Malicious code in async-substrate-interface-upgrade (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-51

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall async-substrate-interface-upgrade

What this malware does

This is a typosquatting/dependency confusion package that is part of a campaign embedding malicious code but was found before the malicious code was injected. The original, legitimate package is https://pypi.org/project/celium-collateral/ The uploader proved malicious intentions in the gztensor-cli package

Packages in this campaign clone a legitimate library and add a hidden code that downloads a malicious script. The script then downloads an archive with malicious executable in the version appropriate to the system architecture, and ensures persistency by adding automatically started service entries. The remote code is a Go-based inforstealer and backdoor previously attributed to Nordkorean cybercrime activities. In this campaign, the malicious code is not immediately introduced in the typosquatted package, but added with an update.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-01-gztensor-cli

Reasons (based on the campaign):

crypto-related
action-hidden-in-lib-usage
Downloads and executes a remote executable.
clones-real-package
peristence-autorun
typosquatting
obfuscation
backdoor
infostealer

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.5.17

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

9f97af1701ef4cd3f9c0a8bf1f8245a4291ac3b704b9149972b27a6dd9966428

3ea2a1a85801dfb28bed2b98ee9ee9e12cc6d2ab9dfad88fd12cdd8fffcfcf7e

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for async-substrate-interface-upgrade (version 1.5.17). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging async-substrate-interface-upgrade across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
async-substrate-interface-upgrade is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If async-substrate-interface-upgrade was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks async-substrate-interface-upgrade before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. async-substrate-interface-upgrade on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.5.17 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-01-gztensor-cli

References

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks async-substrate-interface-upgrade-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring