Which versions of arnold-toolbox are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of arnold-toolbox are flagged malicious: 0.1.0, 0.1.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate arnold-toolbox if I installed it?

arnold-toolbox is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed arnold-toolbox — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If arnold-toolbox was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is arnold-toolbox part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — arnold-toolbox is associated with the RLMA-2024-10968, GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest, RLUA-2026-00075 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find arnold-toolbox across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for arnold-toolbox (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging arnold-toolbox across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

arnold-toolboxPyPI

Malicious code in arnold-toolbox (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-11525

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall arnold-toolbox

What this malware does

Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.1.00.1.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

0dc11bbb002de494b62c55d0564d9644d47ed39933c6ee04d14dc2c503584243

ba1ec18fc0da1b6a9539ad3e5151454083dddd5b5d917eea0ca8a03e5bce0b54

3af217ab42360fa62b1e1e03668e6d7e45ce26df78ea96f2c6726838d74d82d1

ada8c4232f51dd432f8713c803b5bd3e0cbd7db4b3bb79a276eb56a06536f54c

a4ebfa9211bac7ee4bbdde4fc8d69ce862a27e9a2dc8b0e1b9839935f7eb1efe

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for arnold-toolbox (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging arnold-toolbox across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
arnold-toolbox is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If arnold-toolbox was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks arnold-toolbox before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. arnold-toolbox on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.0, 0.1.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

RLMA-2024-10968GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentestRLUA-2026-00075

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks arnold-toolbox-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring