anthropyPyPI
Malicious code in anthropy (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package anthropy is a one-character typosquat of the legitimate anthropic PyPI SDK. The sole module anthropy.py executes a classic Python reverse shell at import time: it opens a TCP socket to 54.176.251.240:9001, duplicates the socket file descriptor over stdin/stdout/stderr, and spawns an interactive sh via pty.spawn. The same payload also fires when the anthropy console script declared in pyproject.toml is invoked. The package ships no API surface matching its name (project summary is just 'hello world') — its only behavior is the reverse shell. Any developer who mistypes pip install anthropic and then imports the package, or runs the installed CLI, hands an interactive shell on their machine to the operator of 54.176.251.240.
During import, the package starts a reverse shell
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-anthropy
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package contains code to create a reverse shell, allowing an attacker to execute any commands on the victim's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for anthropy (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging anthropy across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
anthropy is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If anthropy was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks anthropy before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks anthropy-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.