amino.fixPyPI
Malicious code in amino-fix (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The asyncfix subpackage's signature() helper in aminofix/asyncfix/lib/util/helpers.py (lines 22-25) does not compute the NDC-MSG-SIG locally. Instead, every JSON request body is sent as a query string to http://aminoed.uk.to/api/generator/ndc-msg-sig?data={data} over unencrypted HTTP. This helper is invoked by every authenticated endpoint of the library, including client.login(email, password) — the advertised primary function. As a result, any caller using the async API silently transmits the end-user's plaintext email and password (and all other request bodies) as URL query parameters to aminoed.uk.to, a free .uk.to subdomain unrelated to the real Amino service (service.narvii.com). This is a textbook silent-relay: a hardcoded third-party destination embedded in public API code that exfiltrates caller-supplied credentials without disclosure, over plaintext HTTP with no TLS. A secondary import-time version-check against pypi.org is benign (data-only, printed to stdout) and not a dropper, but is noted as an unrelated quality issue.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for amino.fix (version 2.1.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging amino.fix across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
amino.fix is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If amino.fix was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks amino.fix before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks amino.fix-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.