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Malicious package

amd-taichiPyPI

Malicious code in amd-taichi (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2025-191678
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
pip uninstall amd-taichi

What this malware does

Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest

Reasons (based on the campaign):

  • The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.

  • The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

Malicious versions

10 flagged
0.1.50.1.60.1.70.1.80.1.90.1.100.1.110.1.120.1.131.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

51d6ed28487a2a29433430ce7cc6a369df7fe0b068a767aa31c3ef4ea2374370
4f9a360052987b7df8a2686b98678789e6699d7f6592a2191a5d6346a7897d7d
e478d524426cfc42f7e256ec665d268507bd1acb7c9470081b481877f9d4727f

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer
  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for amd-taichi (10 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging amd-taichi across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    amd-taichi is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

  3. Did it already run?

    If amd-taichi was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks amd-taichi before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. amd-taichi on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.5, 0.1.6, 0.1.7, 0.1.8, 0.1.9, 0.1.10, 0.1.11, 0.1.12, and 2 more flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest

References

Credits

  • Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)

Detect & block this

O3 blocks amd-taichi-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

amd-taichi (PyPI) malicious package — MAL-2025-191678 | O3 Security