aiosendletterPyPI
aiosendletter is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-16264) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.2.0, 3.7, 3.8…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in aiosendletter (PyPI)
What this malware does
The package ships a module (e.py) that prompts for administrator elevation via UAC, archives the contents of %LOCALAPPDATA%\logs with shutil.make_archive, and POSTs the resulting zip to a hardcoded attacker-controlled endpoint at https://sparkling-pine-f202.stilluer-sweden.workers.dev/ using requests.post. The %LOCALAPPDATA%\logs tree commonly contains Discord, browser, and game-tool artifacts including session data. The package's PyPI summary ("Safe bug reporter for sending local logs via Cloudflare Workers") and identifiers such as aiosendletter_logs are cover-story framing for bulk exfiltration of installer-owned data. Separately, pyproject.toml declares the Python stdlib name "ctypes" as an unpinned PyPI runtime dependency, causing pip to resolve and install whatever package currently occupies that registry name and execute its lifecycle code on the installer's machine — a dependency-confusion install-time code path in addition to the primary stealer payload.
Package hides code to exfiltrate files. Most releases target unclear files, but some reveal the goal to exfiltrate sensitive Telegram data.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-09-aiosendletter
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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files-exfiltration
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target:telegram
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for aiosendletter (9 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging aiosendletter across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
aiosendletter is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If aiosendletter was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks aiosendletter before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks aiosendletter-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.