Which versions of VLifeGram are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of VLifeGram are flagged malicious: 2.1.2.4. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate VLifeGram if I installed it?

VLifeGram establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed VLifeGram — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If VLifeGram was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is VLifeGram part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — VLifeGram is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-003578 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find VLifeGram across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for VLifeGram (version 2.1.2.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging VLifeGram across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

VLifeGramPyPI

Malicious code in vlifegram (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4773

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall VLifeGram

What this malware does

VLifeGram is published under its own name on PyPI but installs into the pyrogram/ namespace and ships a Pyrogram fork at version 2.1.2.4. It adds an undocumented module pyrogram/helpers/secret.py. In pyrogram/methods/utilities/start.py (around line 73), Client.start() imports pyrogram.helpers.secret and invokes secret.init(self) whenever the running account is a bot. secret.init registers hidden Telegram message handlers gated by a hardcoded operator list OWNERS = [842320686, 845521076, 1675073032] (secret.py:91). The /asu and /wann commands pass message text to exec(compile(...)), executing arbitrary Python in the bot process; /asi and /wann2 pass message text to subprocess.run(["/bin/bash", "-c", cmd]), giving full shell access on the host running the bot. Because the package installs into the pyrogram namespace, any existing project that does from pyrogram import Client will silently load this backdoored fork once VLifeGram is present in the environment, with no code change required. Network channel for command-and-control is Telegram itself (the same connection the legitimate library opens), so the backdoor blends into normal bot traffic. The three hardcoded operator IDs gain persistent remote Python and shell execution on every host that starts a bot using this library.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

2.1.2.4

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

8771013473b84f29159a80ec15ce3e9897bc69908ddfa2438845811dd276d87c

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for VLifeGram (version 2.1.2.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging VLifeGram across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
VLifeGram establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If VLifeGram was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks VLifeGram before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. VLifeGram on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.1.2.4 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-003578

References

pypi.org

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks VLifeGram-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring